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STRATEGY FOR LABOR REVISITED
SAMUEL ESTREICHER†
[EDITOR’S NOTE: What follows is an unofficial transcript of an
off-the-record conversation among three of the labor movement’s
leading strategists. The meeting was convened by C, or
“cooperationist,” who had been for over ten years the president
of a local union, part of a major industrial union, representing
3,000 employees who had been hired to staff a new
manufacturing plant in a Southern town (“Newplant”).
Newplant had been widely touted as a breakthrough in U.S.
labor-management relations because it was consciously
designed to promote greater participation of production and
maintenance workers in business decisions.
In bitterly
contested local elections last year, C was voted out of office and
now serves in a staff capacity at the AFL-CI0.
A, or
“adversarialist,” a longstanding friend of C, is the research
director of another industrial union. A was very active in the
Students for A Democratic Society in the 1960s, and after
graduating from Antioch College, began his career as a labor
organizer, working for a succession of unions that had been
active in the McGovern-Kucinich wing of the Democratic Party.
S, or “stay the course,” is the highly respected chief of staff for a
national union representing government workers. Section
headings and citations are supplied by the editor and do not
appear in the original transcript.]

†
Dwight D. Opperman Professor of Law & Director, Center for Labor and
Employment Law, NYU School of Law. This is a revised, updated version of an
article (also featuring the technique of a Socratic dialogue) that appeared as Samuel
Estreicher, Strategy for Labor, 22 J. LAB. RES. 569 (2001). The title is from ANDRE
GORZ, STRATEGY FOR LABOR: A RADICAL PROPOSAL (1967). © 2010 Samuel
Estreicher. All rights are reserved.
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SETTING THE STAGE

C: We are discussing tonight what if anything could or be
should be done about the decline of unions in private companies.
We now represent less than eight percent of private workers;1
and we have not yet hit bottom. This has to change if we are
going to speak for all working people, to be a social movement in
the true sense and not just another interest group.
I know we all agree there is a problem, although I suspect we
are not going to agree on solutions. It might be useful, at the
outset, if we stated our initial positions on how we view the
problem and where we think the solution(s) might be.
Let me start.
We’ve just spent a king’s ransom on reelecting Obama and
stymeing the Republican-Tea Party assault, not to mention tens
of thousands of hours of manpower simply getting out the vote.
For the first two years of the first Obama administration, we had
a Democratic Congress and President; only the Senate and the
White House for the last two years, where we now stand for
another four. Last time around, we pushed hard to pass into law
the Employee Free Choice Act2—to get bargaining authority on
the basis of card-checks and a first-time contract through
arbitration—and these Democrats even though they had sixty
votes could not break a threatened filibuster or even force a real
debate on the floor. This has happened before. We broke the
bank electing Clinton and a Democratic Congress in 1992 and
what did we end up with—a study commission and the FMLA!
At the end of the day, what is a Democratic administration likely
to do? We will never get the changes—card-check certification,
repeal of the secondary-boycott and hot-cargo prohibitions, and
outlawing of permanent replacements of economic strikers—that
might really make a difference.

1

See Economic News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Union Members Summary (Jan. 27, 2012), www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.
nr0.htm.
2
See Samuel Estreicher, Improving the Administration of the National Labor
Relations Act Without Statutory Change, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1, 2–4 (2009)
(discussing proposed Employee Free Choice Act of 2007, H.R. 800, 110th Cong.
(2007)).
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Even if magic occurred, and we could get a Canadian-style
package over the hump of a likely filibuster, even this kind of
labor law reform cannot reverse our decline in private companies.
The Canadian unions have secured into law the AFL-CIO wish
list, and their unionization rate in private companies keeps
dropping.3 Sure, we can slow it down with better laws, but we
cannot reverse the trend without a change in what we do, in
what we are about.
We need to go back to basics. Over the course of our history,
labor has been viewed by employers and much of the larger
society as a net cost-adding institution. We produce value for our
members—giving them a voice, providing integrity to an insidethe-firm grievance procedure, establishing portable benefits, and
so on. Sometimes we prod managers to improve productivity as a
means of paying for wage and hour improvements. But on
balance the value we provide to employees and the firm is
outweighed by the costs we add through our traditional
insistence on industry wages and job controls. Sam Gompers
understood this well, and in what we might call “Gompers 101”
insisted that it is labor’s job to impose the standards set in the
union sector on nonorganized firms in the same industry, “to take
wages out of competition” by organizing all product market
competitors.
We were able to achieve this objective for several decades, at
a time when Americans enjoyed a huge domestic market, global
competition was rare, and our companies in many industries
enjoyed a nearly oligopolistic position. The Auto Workers, once
they organized the three major U.S. producers, in effect
organized the entire product market. The Big Three would fight
us on better wages and benefits, but they all knew that, in the

3

In 2004, the unionization rate in the Canadian “commercial sector” (which
excludes public services but includes quasi-governmental Crown corporations and
the publicly financed healthcare industry) hovered around 20%, where it had been
29.8% in 1981. See René Morissette et al., Diverging Trends in Unionization, PERSP.
ON LAB. & INCOME, Apr. 2005, at 5, 6, available at www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/75-001x/75-001-x2005104-eng.pdf. In the first half of 2009, the private-sector unionization
rate in Canada dropped to 16.1%. See Unionization, PERSP. ON LAB. & INCOME, Aug.
2009, at 27, 27, available at http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/75-001-x/75-001-x2009108eng.pdf.
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end, they would face no competitive disadvantage in agreeing to
our terms, because we could credibly promise that the very same
terms would be imposed on all competitors.4
Those days are gone. Product and labor markets are now
global. Achieving Gompers 101—enormously difficult even in the
earlier period—is now virtually impossible.5 And I do not believe
that labor-linked trade rules can significantly change this, for we
will never be able to impose U.S. labor standards on most
producers in the developing world. The “cat is out of the barn”;
we allowed U.S. industry to farm out production to China and its
neighbors, and that ain’t coming back. Perhaps we can impose
occupational safety rules and get these countries to enforce their
own laws against child labor, but we will never be able to impose
our wage and other economic standards.
In the public sector, we have enjoyed considerable gains, and
now represent well over a third of all government workers.6 But
government managers are also, for all practical purposes,
oligopolists. Sure, there are limits on how far they can go in
acceding to union demands, but there is little danger of
negotiating ourselves out of existence. Most government services
are either natural monopolies, like police, fire, and highways, or
are sheltered from any effective product market competition
because they will continue to be financed from taxes even in the
face of widespread dissatisfaction, as in the case of public schools
in some cities.
Some Repubican opportunists will try to turn public opinion
against government labor, but in Wisconsin we forced them to
relearn the political power of organized labor.

4

See Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in a World of Competitive Product
Markets, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 12 (1993).
5
See Samuel Estreicher, “Think Global, Act Local”: Employee Representation in
a World of Global Labor and Product Market Competition, 4 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 81
(2009).
6
U.S. public-sector workers have a union membership rate (37.4%) that is over
five times that of private-sector employees (7.2%) and account for half of total union
membership, even though government work is only one-fifth the size of the private
workforce. See News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union
Members–2009 (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/union2_
01222010.pdf. In 2010, total U.S. union membership declined by 612,000 and the
union membership rate fell to 11.9 % from 12.3% the year before. See Economic
News Release, supra note 1.
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We also need to relearn—to remember the lessons of
Gompers 101. How can we continue to pursue wage and other
economic policies that benefit our membership while at the same
time figuring out ways of reducing the costs of union
representation for employers? That, in my view, is the challenge,
and I hope our discussion today will point out some practical
approaches.
A: We’re old friends, and I respect you despite your
consistent wrongheadedness.
Labor is never going to get
anywhere trying to make itself user-friendly to employers. I am
no longer a Marxist, but the essential Marxian insight still
obtains: The interests of workers are fundamentally adverse to
those of employers, because labor’s gains are purchased at the
shareholders’ expense. Gompers 101 was about imposing costs
on the nonunion sector, not reducing costs for unionized firms.
The essential adversity of interest may have been muted in the
old days, in certain industries, for some of the reasons you give.
But no longer. Today, employers are not committed to their
workers, and are even less committed to their communities.
They are singlemindedly committed to their executives and
shareholders.
Labor is a variable cost; from a human rights perspective it
should be considered a fixed cost. The employer’s focus is on
reducing its dependence on that cost item, by outsourcing, where
feasible, and if that can’t be done, by reducing the level of that
cost. From the employees’ standpoint, however, their jobs
represent an immobile investment, as people are rooted in their
homes, their communities. It is because of that essential
disparity in leverage—firms can desert workers, but workers (in
most situations) cannot easily desert their employers—that
workers cannot fend on their own, unless they have highly
mobile skills that increase in value with time. Most of our
members, and those whom we can plausibly recruit to become
members, are folks without mobile skills, and whatever skills
they bring to the job get eroded over time.
If labor is going to improve its situation, it has to craft
strategies that flow from this fundamental premise. We are
representatives of the dispossessed, and we need to make
ourselves relevant to the dispossessed.
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I agree with you, C, that the usual labor politics is not going
to get us anywhere. The Wagner Act never would have occurred
were it not for the social revolution in the mills and offices, the
imminent explosion in the streets that FDR headed off with the
NLRA and other New Deal legislation.7 We will never get the
right labor law until we become a mass movement again, until
we make clear to the powers that be that our voice cannot be
silenced.8
To become a movement again, we have to organize outside of
the NLRA framework. Take the SEIU’s “Justice for Janitors”
program. The union’s pressure is directed at the users of
janitorial labor, the high-rise office buildings, not the ostensible
employers—the cleaning contractors, the thinly capitalized
operations that do the owners’ bidding. The owners call the
shots, and they should feel the pressure. We can do a good deal
lawfully, through corporate campaigns, community pressure, and
the like—until owners find it in their interests to use only union
contractors. If this can be done for janitors, who have little skills
and can be easily replaced, this can be done for a good many
American workers who have somewhat more mobile skills and
are not so easily replaced.
Sure, we cannot legislate foreign competition out of
existence. But we can make it more difficult for firms presently
under union contract to outsource work.
Where we have
leverage, we can insist on “neutrality” agreements up and down
the supply and vending chain. Labor-linked trade rules are
about slowing down outsourcing abroad, making it more
expensive.
We have a natural alliance here with
environmentalists and students. To borrow from Che: One, two,
many Seattles!
S: It’s great to have this far-ranging discussion. But I think
both of you make too much of our declining unionization rate in
private firms.
That statistic way overstates the potential
unionization that is possible under current law. It includes
people like supervisors and managers who do not have the right
7

See generally IRVING BERNSTEIN, TURBULENT YEARS: A HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN WORKER 1933–1941 (1969); IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE NEW DEAL
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING POLICY (1975).
8
See JULIUS G. GETMAN, RESTORING THE POWER OF UNIONS: IT TAKES A
MOVEMENT 1, 325 (2010).
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to organize, and highly compensated, highly mobile professionals
who never will seek collective representation. If you look at folks
we are capable of organizing (what I would call “achievable union
density”), we are doing a pretty good job. We can do and are
doing better. We have now been able for the first time in living
memory to increase the absolute number of private workers
under union contract.
It is a mistake to measure our success solely in terms of the
unionization rate. It may not be “Gompers 101,” but it is at least
“Gompers 102,” that organized labor shouldn’t try to be a mass
movement. We are the leading force among working people,
raising standards for competition among all workers as we seek
to improve the private interests of our members. We are also the
leading force for a civil society. We have been and can continue
to be the most effective organization in the country for advancing
and protecting workers’, indeed all Americans’, rights, even if we
represent only a small fraction of overall workforce through
collective bargaining. No piece of progressive social legislation
has passed in the last seventy years at least without our political
leadership; no agency regulation worth the effort is promulgated
without our expert assistance and insistence. Sure we want
more density, but not if it means fundamentally altering either
our objectives or mode of operation.
II. TRADE AND EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT
C: I think we’ve done a good job in setting out our basic
differences. Let’s see if we can narrow them somewhat if we
proceed issue-by-issue.
Let’s take trade. Even our standard-bearers from Clinton to
Obama carry the torch for free trade; and they are not reluctant
conscripts. The Democrats do not want to appear anti-consumer
and they are also funded by corporations; our political allies are
never going to pursue the kind of aggressive program that we
need. If we get anything, it will be some kind of papering over of
the dispute, some sort of mechanism for raising issues, as in the
labor side-letter to NAFTA or the labor clause in CAFTA. In the
end, the trade barriers will come down further; U.S.-based
manufacturing will still have to compete with non-U.S. firms—
and increasingly, with nominally U.S. and European companies
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using contractors in China—who will be able, with increasing
ease, to produce competitive goods at markedly lower labor costs
and import them here free of tariffs.
What we can do is help U.S. manufacturers compete for that
segment of the market where our employers still have a
comparative advantage because of the combination of U.S.educated workers, U.S. infrastructure, and high-end products.
How can we help them compete? We need to be smart about
what we are about. We have to drop the old concerns: We’re not
about job classifications, penalizing work out of classification,
grieving over supervisors, and techs doing bargaining-unit work.
We are (or should be) about being agents of employee voice—
improving communication between managers and employees,
making sure workplace norms are fairly developed and fairly
applied,
providing
the
organizational
memory
and
representational skills that give integrity to the grievance
procedure, instilling trust in the negotiated incentive
compensation plan, and reducing the costs of employment
disputes.
U.S. (or foreign) firms are not going to commit new capital to
U.S. plants unless they can be assured of a competitive return on
their investments. They have to reach a certain comfort level
that U.S. plants will in fact be more productive, that a U.S.
workforce brings something special to the table that cannot be
found in Mexico, India, or China, because U.S. workers are
highly educated and committed to organizational goals.
We all know of many unionized industrial plants in the
Midwest that are dead from the waist up, plants that hardly
have any remaining salvage value. No new capital has come into
these plants in decades, or ever will. That should be no surprise
if you spend a day on the shopfloor with those demoralized
workers. The unions have been complicit here because over the
years they have made it hard to fire the troublemakers, the
slackers. Their focus, like management’s, has been on the
endgame: How much can we squeeze out of the sunk, nonportable assets in these plants?
A: I disagree vehemently. It is not our job to manage or comanage. That is management’s job. Our job is to represent those
folks who have no chance ever to reach management’s ranks.
They are the other, the hourlies, the nonexempt, the
implementers, the “touch” workers, the front-line workers, the
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rank and file. We have to protect their jobs and salaries, if we
are to be a trade union in any meaningful sense, in any sense
that can galvanize people to take the risks involved in collective
representation and struggle.
Of course, there are places, especially where new facilities
are being constructed with entirely new work forces, where some
flexibility is possible. However, we have to draw the line at any
programs that compromise seniority, allow standard-less merit
pay, or enlist the union as a partner in the management function.
This is about core commitments, not ideological squeamishness.
If we blur the lines and start taking responsibility for production
and discipline, our members will not understand where we are
coming from; they will see us as “being in bed with the boss,” and
rightly so. Over the long run, we will have trouble balancing
these conflicting roles, and in the process will compromise
ourselves.
This brings us to trade. We can’t stop progress, but we can
stop exploitation. We have a minimum wage, overtime laws, and
occupational safety and health and civil rights laws. These laws
reflect the judgment of our elected representatives that work
cannot be performed in this country except in conformity with
these rules. We have to insist that these standards reflect the
minimum conditions of industrial decency under which U.S.
workers should have to compete with workers anywhere else in
the world. We don’t allow South Carolina to undermine the
federal minimum wage simply because that state believes it
would be better off if it could attract new plants by paying wages
below the federal standard. Why allow China, Indonesia, or the
Philippines a competitive advantage that we disallow our own
states on grounds of industrial decency?
I am not some besotted idealist. I know that we cannot be
too rigid here because we want to promote U.S. exports, but these
rules of industrial decency should be our starting point for trade
negotiations. Today, they are simply swept aside in the interest
of promoting “free trade.” But trade is no more free than labor is
“free” if competition occurs without rules of the game, without
rules of decent competition. We need rules of fair trade, not free
trade.
International trade is about transaction costs. We have
more trade today because certain costs—transportation,
communication—have been reduced as a result of technological
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improvement. To slow down the erosive effect of trade on U.S.
labor standards, we have to increase other costs. Through
political pressure, “local content” legislation, collective
bargaining over outsourcing, and pressure of the sort represented
by Seattle, we have to make it more expensive for U.S. employers
to site work outside of the U.S.
S: To a large extent, I agree with both of you. We don’t have
to choose. We can make clear to U.S. employers that we are open
to new approaches. The Board has opened the door to prerecognition discussion of terms; and we should take advantage of
this opening.9 We are not against employee involvement, teambased systems, and the like if they are freely negotiated with
independent labor organizations.
Without inconsistency, we can continue to fight measures
that lower trade barriers that do not take account of labor
standards. We didn’t want NAFTA, and we would be better off
without it, but the labor side-letter has had a beneficial effect. It
has helped make the Mexican system more transparent, and we
are seeing the beginnings of an independent trade union
movement there. We might also consider establishing U.S.
affiliates in Mexico to further spur these developments. I note
also that recent free trade agreements contain labor-linked
standards of the sort we wanted in NAFTA.
III. CONTINGENT WORK
C: Maybe it’s overstated, maybe it isn’t, but there is
certainly a basis for fearing a fundamental change in the U.S.
labor market. In many places, workers do not have career
employment. Increasingly, they are hired on a “project only”
basis. Even if the “project” lasts for a long time, they are not
employees of the user employer but employees of a referral
agency or are deemed independent contractors. Traditional
union organizing and traditional union objectives assume a
steady employer and a permanent work force interested in things
like seniority protection and defined benefit pension plans.

9

See Dana Corp., 356 N.L.R.B. 49, 8 (2010).
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Contingent workers cannot be readily organized on an
industrial basis. Sure, rulings like Sturgis10 help, and we need to
get it restored into law, but in most cases the temporary workers
will not agree to be in a unit with the user employer’s work force
because they do not share sufficient commonality of interest with
them. In some cases, Sturgis may, paradoxically, make it harder
to organize the user employer’s work force.
If contingent workers are to be organized in decent numbers,
we have to renovate the craft-union model. (I never thought
those words would come from the lips of an old industrial
unionist like me.) We need to provide industry-based or careerbased organizations. We’ve done this in the construction and
entertainment industries, and we need to do it in the temporary
help industry.
What labor’s experience in the construction and
entertainment industries suggests is that we have to figure out
ways we can provide valuable services for temporary workers,
and ways we can provide benefits to unionized firms that at least
offset the costs that union wages, benefits, and grievance
procedures often entail.
Consider some possibilities. The construction-trades model
points to union-provided training services so that people can
rapidly move beyond the entry level; and a referral system that
does a better job than manpower companies in maintaining a
roster of qualified, motivated workers. The entertainment-union
model points to career-building services and an information
clearinghouse informing temporary workers of better
opportunities elsewhere.
Both models also suggest union
provision of portable pension and health insurance.
Can this be done without the law’s help? A relaxation of the
pre-hire contract ban would help, as would a change in the “hot
cargo” clause prohibition allowing us to reach agreements with
user employers that deal only with those temporary-help
agencies that recognize career-based unions. We are not likely to

10
See M.B. Sturgis, Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. 1298 (2000), overruled by H.S. Care
L.L.C., 343 N.L.R.B. 659, 659 (2004).

FINAL_Estreicher (Do Not Delete)

424

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

2/21/2013 11:43 AM

[Vol. 86:413

get such legislation in the near future, and have to do what we
can on our own. Maybe this is Gompers 103: voluntarism, doing
this on our own, without counting on the state to bail us out.11
A: I agree with almost everything you said, but I have a
difference in emphasis. Where we should focus our efforts is in
raising the costs of using temporary help, and this can only be
done by making life as difficult as possible for employers who use
the services of temporary-help agencies. One path is to use our
leverage over the user employers with whom we have contracts
in order to establish terms under which outsourcing can occur,
and at the very least to require neutrality agreements from
companies doing the outsourcing. Another complementary path
is to use Sturgis to organize temporary workers in units that also
include the user employer’s people. There is a community of
interest:
The latter want the higher wages and benefit
improvements that a union contract can bring; the former want
steady employment with union-scale benefits.
S: A very helpful discussion. It seems we need legislation to
establish an §8(f)-type provision12 for other industries that, like
construction,
hire
people
for
short-term,
project-only
assignments. It is doubtful that any time soon, we can get repeal
of Taft-Hartley’s secondary-boycott prohibition,13 but it would
seem that we might be able to get some improvement in the hotcargo prohibition, to the effect that unions should be able to enter
into agreements with user employers governing the terms under
which they will use the services of temporary-help or laborsupply companies.14
IV. CARD-CHECK CERTIFICATION
A: I want to change the terms of our discussion. Even
though EFCA was stalled the last time around, the top priority
item for the labor movement remains getting card-check
certification into law. The issue of whether to have a collective
bargaining agent and who that agent should be is a matter
11
See Samuel Estreicher, Trade Unionism Under Globalization: The Demise of
Voluntarism?, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 415, 417 (2010).
12
29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (2006).
13
Id. § 158(b)(4).
14
See Samuel Estreicher, Freedom of Contract and Labor Law Reform: Opening
up the Possibilities for Value-Added Unionism, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 827, 829 (1996).
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strictly between the worker and that organization. The employer
has no proper role to play in this process. We don’t allow third
parties to decide who your lawyer will be if you want to bring a
divorce proceeding or buy a house. The employer is no different.
He is a third party who has no proper role to play in the workers’
decision whether to bring in a union.
Giving the employer a role in representation elections, as the
law currently allows, is to give the employer an opportunity to
scare workers away from collective representation, through
veiled and actual threats and well-timed discharges of union
supporters. In essence, the workers have to surmount not only
the obstacle of agreeing among themselves to have a collective
agent, they then have to withstand the employer’s lawful and
unlawful campaign. It is no surprise we win only fifty percent of
NLRB elections (even though we normally wait for card
signatures from seventy percent or more of the work force before
filing a petition). What is surprising is that American workers
have the courage to select a union half of the time.
The law should adopt the model of the Canadian system:
certification of a labor organization upon presentation of
petitions signed by, say, sixty percent or more of the work force.
No election is necessary. If the workers ultimately find the
organization unresponsive, they can decertify or, more likely,
withhold their support from a strike. A union that cannot
galvanize its members will have no effective authority; it will
disappear from the scene.
We should make clear to our allies in Congress that this is
still the “red line” for us. We need to pressure them to agree that
no legislation of any kind sought by Republicans that is not
absolutely essential to the workings of the government, passes
without a law giving effect to the unkept promise of the Wagner
Act: the right of self-organization—self-organization, that is, not
employer-approved organization, not organization requiring
herculean effort and courage.
C: There is a lot in what you say. It is exceedingly difficult
to organize in the ways you suggest, but also difficult to remove a
representative. The system is really one of “hard in, hard out”—
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hard to get in a union representative, and hard to remove him.
You urge in its place a regime of “easy in, hard out,” as in
Canada.15
I favor the “easy in” idea but have some reservations about
the “hard out” feature. I agree that employers have no right in
terms of any property or First Amendment right to participate in
elections, but they have a role to play because they provide
information workers should have. They point out the down-side
of unionization and the down-side of the particular organization
seeking bargaining authority. Admittedly, the informational role
that employers play is problematic because they are likely to
overstate—or misstate—the negative, even where they do not
engage in outright threats. But in the absence of some other
source of information, it should trouble us that we are asking
workers to make a decision that effectively could lock them in for
some time, until they can mount the kind of collective action
effort necessary to file a decertification petition. It is not always
true that an unresponsive union is voted out or walks away; often
such a union finds a way to make peace with the employer to the
detriment of the represented employees.
In place of the “easy in, hard out” approach, I propose “easy
in, easy out.”16 We can worry less about how informed employees
are when voting on union representation if we improve the exit
option. In lieu of the current rules that only a labor lawyer could
love (periods of election/certification bar, periods of virtually
irrebuttable and rebuttable presumptions, narrow thirty-day
window period before new contract kicks in with another threeyear contract bar, and thirty percent showing of interest)17 the
law should provide for automatic reauthorization elections
without any showing of interest, say, once every two or three
years. In these elections, the employees now armed with some
information about the actual contract the labor organization has
15

See generally Micah Berul, Revitalizing American Labor through CanadianStyle Certification Reform: Is It in the Cards?, in GLOBAL COMPETITION AND THE
AMERICAN EMPLOYMENT LANDSCAPE: AS WE ENTER THE 21st CENTURY 939 (Samuel
Estreicher ed., 2000).
16
See generally Samuel Estreicher, Deregulating Union Democracy, 21 J. LAB.
RES. 247 (2000).
17
See Kye D. Pawlenko, Reevaluating Inter-Union Competition: A Proposal To
Resurrect Rival Unionism, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 651, 652–53, 692–93, 696 n.270
(2006).
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negotiated and the quality of contract administration it provides,
will be able in secret ballot to decide whether they wish to
reauthorize the bargaining agent.
We can also facilitate rival bids on the theory that the best
way to ensure effective representational services is to create a
competitive marketplace. Rival organizations might appear on
the reauthorization ballot on, say, a ten percent showing of
interest. Election dates could be required to be posted on the
Internet so that interested organizations can keep abreast of
raiding opportunities.
An “easy in, easy out” regime also facilitates a change in the
law with respect to pre-hire agreements. We can worry less
about whether a labor organization represents a majority
preference at the time of recognition, if the employees will have a
low-cost opportunity to vote in secret on the organization’s
continued bargaining authority.
A: You may be on to something, but a major problem I see is
that employers hell-bent on frustrating the wishes of their
employees will dally in bargaining, unwilling to agree even to a
bare-bones contract, simply letting the two- or three-year clock
run—at which point inevitable employee frustration will express
itself in a vote to de-authorize. I don’t see how “easy in, easy out”
can work without providing for first-contract interest arbitration
at least where employers do not bargain in good faith. That is
the Canadian model; it is not automatic interest arbitration, as
EFCA would have provided.18
C: You raise a significant concern, and we certainly know
that under current law employers continue their opposition
campaign even after certification by not agreeing to a first
contract. Remember, however, that we are providing for “easy
in.” An employer who plays games of the type you mention not
only risks alienating his own work force, and in the process
impelling a work stoppage, but also risks re-organization by
other labor organizations. Such an employer will have to think
long and hard whether the benefits of obstructionism really
outweigh these risks.
18
See Roy L. Heenan, Issues for the Dunlop Commission: The Canadian
Experience, Contemporary Issues in Labor and Employment Law: Proceedings of
New York University’s 47th Annual National Conference on Labor 351-84 (Bruno
Stein ed., 1995).
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S: I am essentially in a “listen mode”: This is an interesting
idea, but I do not see how, especially in light of the EFCA
experience, even if the Democrats one day again control both
houses of Congress and the White House, we can get this past a
filibuster in the Senate.
V.

EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES

C: I am glad you raised the issue of political agency. This
brings me back to Gompers 101. We cannot hope to get any of
the labor law changes we are seeking unless we can essentially
form an alliance with some significant segment of employers.
Employers, on the whole, see no need for labor law reform;
they’re pretty much happy with a status quo that spells further
decline in unionism. So any alliance based on compromising
some labor law issue—say, reform of 8(a)(2)—is not likely to
provide enough “quo” for the “quid” we are seeking.
What employers do want is some change in the litigation
system for resolving employment discrimination and other
employment claims. It seems to me that there is some basis for a
grand alliance here. If we are prepared to support a change from
a system based on using the courts to one based on using insidethe-firm grievance and arbitration systems for resolving such
disputes, we have something to offer that employers might find is
worth the price of a more union-friendly labor law, say, of the
“easy in, easy out” form.
Many employers now are doing this on their own. What we
can offer is legal legitimacy through legislation approving of predispute grievance arbitration programs for all employment
disputes, while still permitting administrative agencies to go to
court to challenge systemic wrongdoing.
What we also can provide is practical legitimacy for such
programs, because union representation provides the benefits of
expert advocates, institutional memory, and repeat player
advantages—benefits that private lawyers often cannot provide,
and certainly cannot provide at comparable cost.19 The Court’s
decision in Pyett20 also opens a door here.

19

See Samuel Estreicher, Beyond Cadillacs and Rickshaws: Towards a Culture
of Citizen Service, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 323, 325–26 (2005).
20
14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009).
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A: Intriguing stuff. I have often thought that you missed
your calling, and perhaps should have gone into academics.
First, you want us to cozy up to employers. Now, we are to sell
civil rights down the river.
We are a movement of the forgotten. We are a social
movement of the dispossessed. In the happily now-distant past,
we had a lousy record in some areas on civil rights. One of the
proudest moments for the labor movement was its decisive
support of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, even though that law
created real problems for our construction unions and in many of
our southern plants.21 I do not see how we can make this sort of
deal with the devil without losing our institutional soul and our
credibility with members and those whom we wish to recruit in
the future.
C: Yes, some people lose under the proposal I have outlined:
those who have high-value claims and can command the
attention of high-priced trial lawyers. Those folks will still have
a claim, but they lose the opportunity to win big in the jury
lottery. The folks who gain are the average claimants, the folks
who do not make enough to attract the plaintiff bar and who
cannot afford an hourly fee that most competent lawyers
nowadays require to initiate their services. Today, we have a
litigation system for employment disputes that offers a Cadillac
for the few, but a rickshaw for the many. In its place, we can
offer a Ford for all, and, in the process, secure a rejuvenated
labor movement for workers in private companies.22
S: I like the insistence on U.S.-made automobiles. And I
also find C’s ideas worthy of consideration. I don’t see how we
can even raise this stuff openly, and how we can survive the
barrage of criticism we are likely to encounter from our
colleagues in the civil rights community and plaintiff’s bar.
Let’s continue the conversation over some stiff drinks.

21

See generally HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND
DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY 1960-1972 (1990).
22
See generally Samuel Estreicher & Zev J. Eigen, The Forum for Adjudication
of Employment Disputes, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT LAW (Michael L. Wachter & Cynthia L. Estlund eds., forthcoming
2013).

